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lklnb.ld Nelson laid the ground

re t job
or

J and General Hurley oontributed W'ltiringl.y of his effort

good will between the U.s.s.R.

ure

for
to pro110te

imd China and w1thin China, to unity b tween the

Central Go,.rnment and Yenan.
There ia no doubt, in rq mind, that General Hurley had much to do with laying
the ground work tor the Soong-5talin Treaty or last August
the govern.nt of Chiang

~i-shek

and which I think as

~

hich further strengthened
good agreement tor both

coW'ltriea .
Since the surrender of Japan the situation in China has deteriorated to a great
extent.

ithin a few days a!ter Japan's collapee we sent in the First Warine Divi-

sion to Tsku and Tientsin and followed this by sendlllg the Sixth lfarine

v:l.sion to

T81ngtao and el.fsewhere in Shantung and also the Seventh United States Fleet under
Admiral Daniel Barbey.

Why all these elements were sent to north China was not made

clear to the American public in the beginning and, as near as I can fiad out, they
were acting under orders of the joint chiefs or staff and, I believe, without the
knowledge, in the beginning, of the State Department.

This indicntee to

1118

that

liaison within the top reaches of the Government 1a not very close.

It points up

the need for such a top level relationship between the &tate, Nllvy,

nd

ar Depart-

ments which, incidentally, wu one of 1111 recollll8ndat1ona to President Roosevelt on
lilY return from China latJt January.

Later, as public questioning increttsed, it was

stated that we were bound by our oomitm«mts to the Central Oovel'tlJII8nt of China to
help disaJ"Dl the Jape and that our forces would be withdrnn very shortly.
&:>wever, reports out of China stated that by January
our soldiers would re

l, 1946, only 6,000 of

in in that coWlt.ry - eh01ring a good sized withdrawal ot our

-3China theater p rsonnel - but that 53,000 marines and undi cloaed thousands ot
naval personnel -would re
th cla

in for an indefinite period of time.

This did not stop

r for the ldthdraw&l of our men but only increased suspicion that we in-

tended to continue to intervene in what many or us consider to be p..u-ely a Chinese
internal problem.
Then, on November

:21,

Secretary of State Byrne

issued a statement as followsa

The United States Government will keep armed forces in north China until
it has carried out a pledge to the J panese Government to effectuate the surrender
of all Japanese troops in China and transport them to their homeland.
The question arises, fuy was this atatemmt made 3 months after Japan•a surrender?

Furthermore, what was so secret about it that kept it froll being made

public immediately after it was agreed to? It appeara to me that had the latter
course been follo ed the American public would have accepted it, the reasonl tor
our pursuing such a policy would have bettn understood and the present disquietina
situation avoided.

It must be understood that our China polic.y, until J pan •a

surrender, was clear and above board.

Our postwar policy, then, and our reuon

tor eending marines and naval personnel into north China is to disarm Japanese
· troops there.

The next question is, lbw many Japanese troops are there and bow

lofli will it take to disarm them.

I have tried to find out the approximate number

ot armed Japanese but I find no agreement on the total .

According to a letter rroa

Tientsin to the St. Louia Post-Dispatch i .t is stated that 1
General Ho Ying-chin, Conmander in Chief of the Chinese Army, announced on
October 30 that except tor remnants at &Jpei and ShantWlg, 90 perc~nt ot the
Japanese troops have been disarmed in the Chinese theater.
In the New york Times of' November 30 the following etatemont is madea

General & Ying-chin, Commander in Chief of Chinese field forces said all
Japanese forces in China had been disarmed with the exception of 100,000 in Hupeh
and Shantung Provinces .
On December 7, the Chinese News Service, an agency of the Chinese Governaent,
stated that 1

-4G neral Ho Ying-chin Co..aander in Chi f of th Chin se
that of all th Japan e troops in Chin over (;0 perc t has b
disarm d .

e story,

Later, 1n th
the J paneee - ttwill b

oen

ral H:> asserted "that

completed within thi.fi

onth. •

hi&

In the ,

November 29, General Hurley iB quoted as saying there are still on
Japanese 1n China .

Whether or not they are all armed ia not stated.

or

in

- di

o tot

to two million

ntrWB-

The

paper on November 25, said there were 3001 000 Japanese soldiers and civilians in
north China and on November 28 it carried another tor,y which said there were J , OOO,
000 Japanese soldiers and civllikilB there .

On November 27 I also found out froa an

authoritative personal source that there were 500,000 armed Japanese aoldiera and
800,000 Japanese civilians there.
The Pathfinder, a national weekly, states in its issue of Deoember 5 tbkt
Secretary or State Byrnes "estimated 300,000 Japanese soldiers and 30,000 of their
civilians remain in n01·th China. " The United States News for December 7, atatea
"The firBt task of 'eneral arshall will be to aid in d1s811Ding the 1,000,000 J panese who still are in China . "
It ia hard to reconcile all these figures and they exemplify, by their disparity,
the confusion or aind which exist& in this country .

In

~

opinion, the n\lllber ot

Japan••• soldittrs who need to be disarmed nusbero between 100,000 and 500,000.

In

line 111. th our signed agreement with Japan on August 16, we 'have to keep our pledge
to disarm. these soldiers .

I feel, though, that a definite date should be eet where-

by these soldifJr& should be disarmed and our boys on their way homo.

That they all

should have been disarmed before this is obvious but our pledge must be kept.
is 1111 underata ndi.ng that we will not have anything to

oo

1t

with repatriating Japanese

civilian personnel, so under these circumstances, the task of di.BM.rming Japan'&
soldiers should not take our 53 1 000 marines too long.
There has been a great deal said aoout collllllUI'lism 1n China, 1n our State
ment, and Russia •• position in China.

part-

These questions should all be considered in

-5the light of facts and not innuendoes .

General HUrley in discussing the Communists

in China stated there might be some among thea who look to

osoow !or guidance, but

be tb::>ught most or them were just reformers-outs who wanted to be the ina .

"The only difference between Chinese Communi.stli and Oklaho&ll Republicans," he
said, "is that the Oklahoma Republicans are not armed. "
There
Chinese Co

re otber differences which should be noted such as the fact that the
uniat Party has its own laws, currency, tax system, and government, and

also that whUe the lsaders like

o Tee-tung, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Md others are

Marxist ColllllllJliBts 1 the great IDBBs of the people in the areas under their control are
as General Hurley puts it, "reformers" in an agrarian sense.
In the matter or Russia and its position I should like to quote a news story
on General Hurley's Pres

Club

~peach

carried in tho na&hington Post issue

ot

November 29, 1945s
Vaj . Gen . Patrick J . Hurley, who thi.nks the American people deserve more
information about fore~n affai~s, yesterday told the story or tho 1944 conference
w:i. th artJhal Stalin in the Kremlin. He said the interview convinced him that, in
Stalin's opinion, the Chinese Comn:unists were not Comm\.ll1.8ts at ~ .
Tbe position ot both .&l.arshal Stalin and Foreign COJII!lieaar J4olotov, Hurley said,
was that Russia waa not supporting the Chinese Communist Part,.-, that she would aup_port
the govern•nt and 1 . adership or QeneralisaiDJ Chiting Kai-shek, and that she desired
more harmonious relatione with Chin •
General Hurley said that when he reported all this to the Chinese leaders in
Chungking, they could hardly believe it . Then T. V. Soon-a, China's Foreign Jiinister,
scow and in Augu~t there was aolemized a 30- yoar treaty in which Russia
went to
agreed to support Chiang Kai-ahek' s govern~~~tnt and agreed further to get out ot
Manchuria and recognize China's Bovereignty there.
"In all justice to Stalin and olotovn 1 Hurley sa~d, •I must ~ate that not tor
one mo ent while I wae in China did they ever break their lf'Ord with me. "
The Soong..Stalin treaty of August 14 cert5.1nly was a pledge of outright support
to Chungking Wid was anything but welcomed by the Chinese Comuniats .

According to

the pres , it would appear that the Russ1ans in lfl4nchuria are pursuing a double
course ot "eaiating the Chinese Communists and hindering the entry of Kuomintang
troops.

It is extremely hard to get a realJ.y accurate picture of ...t"fain in Manchuria,

but on the basis of late reports it Beems to be shaping up as follows l
According to the Cbristian Scieftce ronitor of November 29 1 the Ruaai&na are

tri.thdr wing fro

nchuria on

are stripping the country ot

chedule.
raac~&r;~

ColllllUni.Bts, this paper statea t
these chaJ.ri

bout t

Char

t

ian&

tind leaving th fivld to th Chin •

Russi.llrls are

ing no official

are true or not, I ao not knawr, as Chungking it

official concerning

t th Ru
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t~lf ha

aid nothin&

the~.

The llew York Time

ot

1~v

ber 30

ke

the followin

state

nts 1

The :Moscow radio said toni(Jl t that Russia hks •consented" t.o
Chinese
request that it. deter "for eo• time" witbdr&.wal of nuasian troops .froa Nanchuria.
* said China had asked tor the postponement becaUSE! •the
The broadcast
Chinese Government as encounterin considerable ditficulty in transferring troope
to nchuri& oldng to the presence ot Chinese non-Qovernll:8nt troops 1n so
place •"
The Russ1.ans, according to the broadcast, had planned the withdrawal or troops
by Decemb3r 12, in accordance with ttw Russian-chinese trvaty or August 14, by 1lh ich
Russia recognized China's eoveroignty in anchuria.
The radio reported the Chinese as &ayi.ng that their Central Government "would
not be able by that date (December l2) to transfer its troops and organize a civil
administration in Yanchuria, and said the Russian acceptance of the rvquest w greeted
with great oatisfaction in China.
The ashinuton Post

or

December 2 carries the following atatementa

Veamrhlle, Chungking got a great lift from the official announcemnt of a
new Soviet agreement under which the Russians will ~1&7 until January 3 their
withdrawal from vital Manchuria.
This 1-month postponeroent will give the Chungking government time to send
administrative personnel l.lnd troops into strategic cities of anchuri.a ahead ot
Gbinese Communists .
It would appear, therefore, on the basis of these press reports that the letter,
I

if not the full spirit, of the Soong.Stalin treaty is being carried out 1n regard
to Ruaaian withdrawal from Manchuria.
In the matter of Colll!lunist aympathizera in the Far :.astern Divi.Bion of the
State DeparttiM!Ilt I can only say on the basu of a short personal acquaintance durin&
my Jniasion to China for President Roosevelt lest year wit•t \leesrs. Oeorge Atch son,

Arthur Ringwalt, Fulton Freeman, sod others whoa I met in the E basay at Chungking
that they are high type, conscientious, patri0tic Americana.

The implication toot

these men have fallen down in their ret:iponsibilities is an impression that I do not
share• because their interests have first and foremost been in our comtry•• behalf.

-7Personally, I have every confidence in them and until proved ot herwiae I am
delighted that we can continue to havo the use of their valuable and outstandin&
services 1n the Stat

Department .

There has also been some adverse comment about our military leadership in
China.

Our Chinese theater coJIU'IIander, Lt . Gen . Albert

outstanding job there.

c.

Wedemeyer, has done an

e are extremely fortunate in having a man of his caliber

and understanding in this particular spot .

I know there has been some criticism

of his activities in Ch1na 1 s post war situation, but I think it is only fair to
estate that he io acting under the orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff anC. not on

hiG own respon6ibility.
It is interesting to note in this respect that on December 8 Gen . Douglas
llacArthur, n!ter a .2-day top socret Tokyo conference with Admiral Spruance, Pacific
Fleet Commander; Vice Adnrl.r5l

arbey, of the United [:tates Seventh Fleet; and Gen.

Wedemeyer announced that rocommEJndatione would be made to the Joint Chiefs of Starr
regarding "repatriation of Japanese troops i.'"l China "nd allocation of resources . "
1 suppose the "resources" refers to tho disposition of American troope and material

in China .

Is it possible that the Joint Chiefe of Staff have been making our

foreign policy in China and elsewhere rather than our

01m

State Department'?

General Wedemeyer has been critieized by certain elements in this oountcy and
in China because he

t~a

not replied to a communication received some weeks ago

by General Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Chinese Communists which protested
American

int~rvention

in China.

~s

answer stated hie position quite clearly when

he said"By direction of my Government, I deal only with the CentrAl Government of
China .

Government does not recognize any other eovernment in China. " In this

he i.8 correct.
When questioned about the presence o£ a United States liaison group at Communist headquarters in Yonan which suppoaedly implied recognition of the Communist
government he stated that the group was there when he came to China and that its job
was to report on Japanese operations and fa~ilitate the return of American fliers

-add d t

forced do11111 in Colllllrlist nd J panese held t rritory.
remo• d th group with the
terpreted 11 b7 the Co

nd of the

uni t •

becau e

Had GenerRl

e

uch

m:>V

11

t h

d not

ht

yer been in favor of ll-<n1t

intervention again t the ColDIIUnists he would not have adopted the sane and

ound

policy 1n this instance.
About the position of the United States in China we recognize only the
Chwgking Govel'lllll6nt of Chiang Kai-shek,

ThiM 1s the govern.l'llent recognized by

Brit1an, the U. S . S.R. and every other country carrying on relation with the Chinese
Republic and thia should continue to be our polio7.
lfu.rley and Generals Stilwell and

edemeyer we have done our best to bring the

Kuolli.ntang and the Co1111uniste together.
the device of armed intervention.

Through Ambassador Oausa and

This we should continue to ch but not through

To uphold Chiaog and his government we are

helping to disarm Japanese troops, w have transported Koumint.ang troops by ea
and air to Shantung, and we have sent 1n l&arines to hold certain areu untU luomin-

tang troops could get thore and take over.
Ju.st who waa directly responsible for all thi& I do not know tor sure. Certa1nl7
no Ambassador had that auch power &nd certainly General

edemeyer

Wa&

not acting on

his own authoritY'• The Secretary of State denied any knowledge of the use ot
Karines in North China 1n mid Aueu&t so the only place wlwre thi authority could
have come from would be the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in
course, brings our new Ambassador to China. Gen. George
picture .

c.

ashington.

Thia, ot

Marshall, into the

Somebody, somewhere, made a recollllD9ndation to ta&hington as to what our

policy 1n China should

)M .

General Marshall known- or can find out- who made

reco. .ndation .from the field .

the

He known, I am sure, far 111ore about the Chinese

situation than many China experts and 1 feel he will look into this aaituation with
out tear or favor and will

w

hie beBt, &s always, for his country and hi& people.

He 1a well acquainted with StUweU,

edemeyer, and Hurl.ey; he has an open

mind, and he will not be swayed by friendship but by .facts.
with tremendoua prestige he :-o-11 serve ua well.

Able,

frien~,

and

..

..

-9The appointJU!mt of oen. George

c.

sho.ll as our new Aubaasador to China 1.8,

in rq opinion, tba best poQsible choice this country could mke.

He has been given,

not only the most difficult but also one of the most thankless joba in the w:.>rld.

His appointment shows how important we consider China end how dif ieult or solution
th Chinese problem is .

His prestige, courage, and common sense will all be needAtd

in the g reatest degree.

Perhaps the probl

have any one

is not capAble of aolutionJ but

n woo can unlock the key to the Chinese puzzle, that

IIIIUl

it we

i8 General

1iarshall.
The post of Ambassador to China not only holds the key to Sino-American relations
but it also, in rq opinion, holds a p::rt of the answer to the queation of Ru•soAmeriean relations

&18

well.

It liWiit be remembered that l&anchuria, where the crwt ot

the present situation seems to lie, was where .orld

ar 11 started in September 1931.

Let us hope that this terri tory Will not also mark the beginning

of

orld ar 111.

I have great confidence that when General atarvhall studies the situation 1n
China he will make reco•endationa looking forward to the withdrawal ot A.llerican
troops by a definite date and that he will propose an American policy toward China
based on good will, tolerance, and 111tual understanding .

The American people must be kept more fully informed of our forei&n policy so
that they may know in what direction we are heading.

The American congress,

especially the Senate Foreign Relations Comittee and the House Foreign Attain
Collllllittee, must also be informed.
I have spoken on China primarily, but we uhould remember that the Chinese
situation is tied to the relit or Asia.

The ferment 1n China 1a being reputed in

Indonesia, Indochina, Burma, India, :(ran, Syria, and elsewhere .
not ao DUch a (,hinese policy as
is the sa

&n

through that continent.

tihat we need 1.a

Asiatic policy1 because fundamentally the iaeue

The real issue in China, in the mind of the

erican people, is intervention.

e haw t1ro choices, either intervene all the way or gat out by a definite date.
I! we do decide to intervene, which
armed fore

pray we do not, we

in China for years to come because the present

st be prepllr d to

intain

ituation will not, ot

itself, be cleared up overnight.
e must act promptly to clarify our foreign policy o that we

.
as possible,
aocomplish.

just what is going on, why it is being d;)ne, and what
e must not develop an "iron curtain" of our own.

y know,

tar

expect to

e must continue to

upb:>ld Alll8rica •a traditional China policy or nonintervention in her internal a!'!airs .
The settle ment between Chungking and Yen an is a diplomatic pro blea with which our
troope in China should have no concem.

Russia and the United States should offer

ita good diplomatic o!.t'iceu to stop the conflict, but we should not, under any
circumstances , p;.rticipate in it.

e JIIUSt not allow a situation to develop again ,

in China or elsewhere, where the force of public opinion becomes necessary to brina
the true story into the open .

There has been no need for secrecy in this instance,

and the results achieved by our calfuuillg postwar China policy should serve as a
r eminder to ws that the truth and the truth only wUl eatia.ty the American public
at home and tho American boys who are being forced to do an unpleasant job 1n north
China today.

